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Abstract
We develop a model of a prediction market with ambiguity and derive
testable implications of the presence of Knightian uncertainty. Our model can
explain two commonly observed empirical regularities in betting markets: the
tendency for longshots to win less often than odds would indicate and the ten-
dency for favorites to win more often. Using historical data from Intrade, we
further present empirical evidence that is consistent with the predicted presence
of Knightian uncertainty. Our evidence also suggests that, even with informa-
tion acquisition, the Knightian uncertainty of the world may be not learnable
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1 Introduction
At least since the work of Knight (1921), economists have understood that economic
agents may behave di¤erently in risky circumstances, where outcomes are random
but governed by known probabilities, as opposed to uncertain circumstances, where
risks are unknown. Ellsberg (1961) provides examples that highlight the tendency
for some decision makers to be averse to the presence of Knightian uncertainty or,
ambiguity.
In recent years, there has been an explosion of theoretical work developing models
that incorporate ambiguity aversion, building o¤of the seminal contribution of Gilboa
and Schmeidler (1989). In the literature to date, Knightian uncertainty has been a
factor inserted in a model that could possibly explain puzzling observations. It has
served a role analogous to that of dark matter in cosmological models, lurking behind
the scenes to explain observed phenomena, never being directly observed. At the same
time, a rich literature has evolved exploring the e¢ ciency of betting and prediction
markets that price specic events. Following on the early work of Kahneman and
Tversky (1979) and Asch, Malkiel and Quandt (1982), the ability of these markets
to predict future events has been studied extensively, and a number of empirical
anomalies have been identied.
In this paper, we extend the theoretical literature and connect it to the prediction-
market application. In so doing, we develop more direct observable implications of the
presence of Knightian uncertainty than has been achieved previously in the literature,
and a method to test for its presence.
While we below will formally derive a model that suggests our test, the intuition
of our approach is quite straightforward and can be illustrated using an example from
Ellsberg (1961). Suppose that we have two urns. In one urn, we have 50 black balls
and 50 red balls. In another urn the Knightian urn we have 100 balls, but we
have no information regarding the proportions. A subject is o¤ered a game. If she
pulls a black ball out of the urn, she wins $1. If she pulls a red ball out she wins
nothing. The literature has documented a tendency for individuals to prefer the urn
with the known probabilities, suggesting that they exhibit the aversion to ambiguity
discussed above.
Suppose that an econometrician could observe games played with both of the urns
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in Ellsbergs game. With a number of repeated trials, the sample proportions from
the rst urn would fairly rapidly indicate an estimate that the binomial probability of
victory is 50 percent. With enough data, one would say that with great condence.
On the other hand, if one observed repeated play with the second, Knightian urn
which, after all, has some number of black balls in it, then the sample proportion
would also converge to an estimated binomial probability, but that probability would
not necessarily be 50 percent.
The observation that motivates this paper stems from this thought experiment.
Given a market derived ex ante probability of a binary event, as one frequently
observes in betting markets, there will naturally be circumstances where information
is extremely solid, and odds are quite far from 50 percent. There will also be situations
where information suggests there is an even match (as with a coin ip), and the
contract suggests there is close to a 50 percent chance of either outcome. This often
happens, for example, in presidential futures markets in the U.S. after the conventions
are over. But it is also possible that there are contracts that suggest that the odds
of either outcome are 50 percent because the event is shrouded in ambiguity. If we
were to estimate the ex post sample proportions from just these contracts with ex
ante 50 percent probabilities, then they could, as in the Ellsberg example above,
be anything. If we were to estimate the ex post sample proportions of the high
information contracts with probabilities far from 50 percent, the proportions and ex
ante probabilities should, if markets are e¢ cient, align. But close to 50 percent, they
might not, and if they do not, it is indication of the presence of Knightian uncertainty.
Thus, the pattern by which the relationship between ex post proportions and ex
ante probabilities deviates from the 45 degree line becomes informative regarding the
presence of Knightian uncertainty. We also discuss the extent to which learning can
occur in markets over time. If Knightian uncertainty induces knowledge acquisition,
then the relationship between proportions and probabilities will evolve as a market
matures, a possibility we explore in the paper.
The next subsection briey reviews the literature. In Sections 2 and 3, we draw on
the work of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) and Dow and Werlang (1992) and develop
a model that suggests that the pattern described by our intuitive example would
emerge in a market inuenced by the present of signicant Knightian uncertainty. In
Section 4, we provide some high-level evidence that the relationship between ex post
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proportions and ex ante probabilities is consistent with the predictions of our model.
Section 5 concludes.
1.1 Literature Review
This paper draws from two di¤erent strands in the literature. First, theorists have
made remarkable strides in recent years incorporating Knightian uncertainty and
ambiguity aversion into models of nancial markets.
These models have, according to an exhaustive recent review, implications for
portfolio choice and asset pricing that are very di¤erent from those of SEU (subjective
expected utility theory) and that help to explain otherwise puzzling features of the
data.1 Ambiguity aversion could help explain the tendency of markets to stop op-
erating during nancial crises, for prices to not be completely informative, and even
for there to be bank runs.2
This branch of the literature has focused on nancial markets in general. At the
same time, an equally impressive literature has emerged exploring the functioning
of prediction markets, which, for the most part, price in the probability of specic
binary events. As Thaler and Ziemba (1988) rst noted, these prediction markets
may be a better laboratory to test cutting edge theories, as they contain contracts
with known durations, and observable discrete events that stop the trading. While
an equity might live on virtually forever, a presidential election future has a specic
end date, and its ability to forecast the outcome can be precisely evaluated.
This second literature has advanced both empirically and theoretically. On the
theoretical side, Manski (2004) rst illustrated that the beliefs of bettors may not
necessarily yield a market-based probability. More recently, Wolfers and Zitzewitz
(2006) identify the conditions under which prediction-market prices coincide with
bettorsmean beliefs about probabilities. On the empirical side, prediction markets
have been found to be informative regarding the odds of events occurring. Berg et
al. (2008), for example, nd that the Iowa Electronic Markets outperformed polls in
predicting election outcomes. At the same time, markets have been found to exhibit a
favorite-longshot bias, with favorites outperforming their odds, and longshots under-
1See Epstein and Schneider (2010), p. 315.
2See Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2008), Caballero and Simsek (2013), Guidolin and Rinaldi
(2010), Routledge and Zin (2009), and Uhlig (2013).
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performing (see, e.g., Cain, Law and Peel, 2000). A number of possible explanations
for this pattern include insider trading (Shin, 1992), risk loving behavior (Weitzman,
1965), and imperfect ability to process information (Snowberg and Wolfers, 2010).
The connection of these two literatures seems quite promising, as betting markets
often exist for events, such as Brexit or elections, for which Knightian uncertainty
may well be present. Since they also have nite and determinate life spans, they also
allow the econometrician the ability to evaluate their performance ex post. We now
turn to illustrating the utility of this approach.
2 A Model of Prediction Market with Ambiguity
2.1 Setup
Events and Contracts. Consider a prediction market for the occurrence of a bi-
nary event. There are two all-or-nothing contracts corresponding to the two possible
realizations. One contract pays $1 if event A occurs and $0 otherwise, while the
other contract pays $1 if the complementary event Ac occurs and $0 otherwise. Let 
denote the price of contract A. No-arbitrage condition dictates that, in equilibrium,
the price of contract Ac be 1  .
Traders. There is a continuum I of competitive traders, each endowed with ho-
mogeneous initial wealth w. The net position on contract A held by trader i is
denoted by xi 2 R.3 Given price , the nal wealth wi of trader i is
wi =
(
w + (1  )xi if event A occurs,
w   xi if event Ac occurs.
All traders have log utility of their nal wealth: u (wi) = lnwi.
3In practice, trader i can long and/or short contract A and/or contract Ac; but some strategies
are mathematically equivalent. For example, holding mi > 0 units of contract A and ni > mi > 0
units of contract Ac would be equivalent to holding mi units of cash, 0 unit of contract A , and
ni   mi > 0 units of contract Ac: Therefore, without loss of generality, we let a single decision
variable xi = mi   ni (which could be positive, zero, or negative) represent the netposition held
by trader i:
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Beliefs and Ambiguity. Suppose trader i has a subjective belief that event A
occurs with probability eq 2 [0; 1]. Then, the subjective expected utility of trader i
from holding position xi at price  is given by
U (; xi; eq) = eq ln (w + (1  )xi) + (1  eq) ln (w   xi) :
However, ambiguity exists, for traders may be uncertain about how likely event
A is to occur. We follow Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) and model ambiguity using
the multiple-prior framework. Specically, suppose each trader i considers every
probability eq 2 [qi   ; qi + ], where   0, an admissible probability that governs the
realization of the binary event. Under this framework, qi represents the meanbelief
of trader i, while  is interpreted as a measure of ambiguity. Given price , trader i
chooses position xi to maximize the minimum that is, the worst-case scenario of
all her admissible, subjective expected utilities:
max
xi2R

mineq2[qi ;qi+]U (; xi; eq)

: (1)
Traders are heterogeneous in mean belief. Let the distribution of tradersmean be-
liefs be characterized by a cumulative distribution function F over interval [; 1  ].
That is, for the most pessimistic trader, the worst-case belief that A occurs is prob-
ability 0 while, for the most optimistic trader, the best-case belief that A occurs is
probability 1.
2.2 Optimal Demand and Portfolio Inertia
Solving the inner minimization reduces the optimization problem (1) to
max
xi2R
U (; xi; qi   sgn (xi) ) ;
where sgn () is an indicator function that takes the sign of its argument.
The intuition behind the above expression is straightforward. If trader i has a
positive position on contract A, then the worst-case scenario would be that event A
occurs with probability qi   , the lower bound. Similarly, if the position of trader
i is negative, then, in the worst-case scenario, event A occurs with the upper-bound
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probability, qi + .
Solving the maximization problem gives the optimal (net) demand for contract A
by trader i,
x (; qi) =
8>><>>:
qi  
(1 )w if  2 [0; qi   ) ;
0 if  2 [qi   ; qi + ] ;
qi+ 
(1 )w if  2 (qi + ; 1] ;
(2)
as a function of price and mean belief. Therefore, trader i longs contract A when the
price is lower than her most pessimistic belief, and shorts contract A when the price
is higher than her most optimistic belief. For any price in the intermediate range
[qi   ; qi + ], trader i does not participate in the prediction market the phenom-
enon of portfolio inertia.
That portfolio inertia arises when investors have maxmin preferences is well known
in the nance literature since the work by Dow and Werlang (1992). The setup of this
model replicates this phenomenon in the context of prediction markets. In particular,
for each trader, the size of price region at which portfolio inertia occurs is given by
2. In other words, the higher the degree of ambiguity, the more inertial the traders
portfolios.
2.3 Equilibrium
Given price  for contract A and distribution function F of tradersmean beliefs, the
aggregate (net) demand for the contract is given by
XF () =
Z 1 

x (; q) dF (q) : (3)
The prediction market is in equilibrium when the aggregate demand for contract A
equals zero, that is, XF () = 0. The following proposition establishes the equilibrium
price.4
Proposition 1 Given distribution function F , the equilibrium price F is such that
F = EF (q) +
Z F+
F 
F (q) dq   :
4We relegate all proofs to Appendix A.
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When ambiguity is absent (i.e.,  = 0) the prediction market aggregates the wis-
dom of crowds:
F j=0= EF (q) :
That is, the equilibrium price of contract A corresponds to the average of traders
mean beliefs about the occurrence of event A.
In the presence of ambiguity, however, the prediction market does not necessarily
aggregate the wisdom of crowds. In particular, it aggregates the wisdom of crowds
if and only if the distribution function F is such that
R F+
F 
F (q) dq = . The next
proposition shows that the situations in which such equality happens to hold are
topologically rare.
Proposition 2 The prediction market rarely aggregates the wisdom of crowds.
Formally, let  be the space of probability distributions over [; 1  ], endowed with
the weak topology. Then, the subset of probability distributions such that the equilib-
rium price equals the average of tradersmean beliefs is nowhere dense in .
Propositions 1 and 2 together suggests that the presence of ambiguity renders the
prediction market ine¤ective in aggregating the beliefs held by heterogeneous traders.
Proposition 3 The equilibrium quantity of trades is strictly decreasing in the degree
of ambiguity.
Proposition 3 is a direct consequence of portfolio inertia. As the degree of ambi-
guity increases, the inaction rangeof each trader i, [qi   ; qi + ], becomes wider.
Since each trader is more likely to stay put in a more ambiguous environment, the
aggregate trades must be fewer as well. This result is reminiscent of well-known mod-
els of ambiguity in nancial economics (e.g., Caballero and Krishnamurthy, 2008;
Guidolin and Rinaldi, 2010; and Routledge and Zin,2009), which suggest that a sig-
nicant increase in Knightian uncertainty may contribute to liquidity hoarding and
market breakdown.
Moreover, the deterrence of trades in a particular way is what causes the failure of
the prediction market to aggregate beliefs. Specically, for any prevailing price , the
traders who stay put are those with moderate beliefs such that their inaction ranges
cover . Those who trade have beliefs that are more extreme either more optimistic
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or more pessimistic than the abstainers. Suppose the abstaining traders did trade,
the chance of the hypothetical market price, after aggregating the abstaining traders
beliefs, happens to be exactly the same as  is zero.
3 Testable Implications
The previous section has derived the equilibrium results under ambiguity. However,
since the degree of ambiguity is not observable, those results cannot be tested directly.
In this section, we impose more information structures on the model and derive
implications that are testable with prediction-market data.
3.1 Information Structures
Suppose the true probability that event A occurs is given by p 2 [; 1  ]. No trader
knows about p for certain. However, there is a mass m 2 (0; 1) of traders whose mean
beliefs equal p, while all the other uninformed tradersmean beliefs are continuously
distributed over [; 1  ]. Assumption 1 embeds these additional structures into the
distribution function F .
Assumption 1 The distribution function F takes the following form:
F (q) 
(
(1 m)F (q) if q 2 [; p) ;
(1 m)F (q) +m if q 2 [p; 1  ] ;
where F is some continuous distribution function of q over [; 1  ].
The functional form of F is left unspecied. We let  denote the integral of F ,
i.e.,  (q)  R q

F (q0) dq0.
The interpretation of Assumption 1 is that there are some traders who are in-
formed while the others are not. One could provide a micro-foundation for this setup
by assuming that the mass m of traders have the correct mean beliefs because they
have received private signals informative of the true probability, while all other traders
have received no such signals. With such a micro-foundation, the traders(multiple)
beliefs should be interpreted as their (multiple) posteriors. In this section, we adopt a
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reduced-form approach and build these details directly into the distribution function
F .
As will be clear in the next subsection, the assumption of a massm is not essential
to deriving testable implications. Whether m is extremely small, in which case few
traders are informed, or very large, which means most traders are informed, the main
results, shown in Proposition 4, are unchanged. The essence of this setup is that a
fraction of traders hold beliefs that are informative of the true state of the world.
Therefore, when these informed traders do not participate in the market, their beliefs
will not be reected in the equilibrium price.
3.2 Implications
Since the distribution function F is given and parameterized by the true probability
p, applying Proposition 1 allows us to solve for the equilibrium price as a function of
p, as shown below.
Proposition 4 Under Assumption 1, the equilibrium price  (p) is:
1. continuous, with  () >  and  (1  ) < 1  ;
2. such that  (p) = b for any p 2 [b   ; b + ];
3. strictly increasing for p =2 [b   ; b + ];
where b is identied by b    (b + ) +  (b   ) = 1  2   (1  ).
Figure 1 plots the equilibrium price in a p  diagram, where the true probability
p = () 1 () is a correspondence of the equilibrium price . Specically, it attains
a non-singleton set value when  = b, with the size of that set equal to 2.
The most important feature of the equilibrium (part 2) is that there exists a
range of true probabilities, [b   ; b + ], within which the market price is not at all
responsive to any change in the underlying state of the world. That is, 0 (p) = 0
for any p in that range. Instead of prediction, the prediction market simply assigns
an uninformative number b the mid-point of the range [b   ; b + ] as the price.
The reason for this result is straightforward: Since the traders who hold private
information about p are not trading, what exactly those traders know about the true
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Figure 1: Prediction Market Equilibrium in the p  Diagram.
state of the world must not be reected in the market price. Morever, note that
the size of the segment [b   ; b + ], measuring the degree of ambiguity, does not
depend on m, the mass of traders who are informed of p. Even if m is innitesimal,
the market price stops reecting the true probability once these traders abstain from
betting.
Outside the range [b   ; b + ], however, the prediction market works (part 3).
Specically, if all parameters of the model were known, one would be able to infer
the true probability p from the equilibrium market price  (p). The higher the true
probability, the higher the price.
Part 1 of the proposition also shows that, for a true probability that is very high
(near 1   ) or very low (near ), the equilibrium price exhibits a favorite-longshot
bias commonly observed in the literature (e.g., Cain, Law, and Peel, 2000): favorite
events are under-priced while longshot events are over-priced. The intuition is as
follows. For a longshot event where p = , for example, if the market price was as
low as , that would imply all tradersmean beliefs were greater than the prevailing
price and, hence, all traders would long the contract, which cannot be an equilibrium.
Therefore, the equilibrium price of a longshot must be signicantly larger than the
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longshots odds.
Note that, although the degree of ambiguity, , is not directly observable in reality,
Proposition 4 yields implications of the presence of ambiguity that are testable with
prediction-market data. Suppose an econometrician could conduct a large number of
repeated trials for each value of the true probability. Then, with enough data, the
ex post sample proportion, denoted by P , would converge to the corresponding true
probability, p. It follows that the estimated relationship between P and the market
price, , would converge to the graph of the correspondence p = () 1 (). As in
Figure 1, such ideal trials would show a big jump at price level  = b, with P being
generally below the 45-degree line below but close to b, and above it just thereafter.
Moreover, since the relationship between P and  fundamentally shifts between the
two continuous segments, our result suggests a testable structural change near the
jump in at b.
Before conducting the test, the econometrician may not know where the jump
would appear, because b, given by
b    (b + ) +  (b   ) = 1  2   (1  ) ;
depends on the distribution of mean beliefs among all prediction-market traders. It
follows from the above equation that b would be smaller than 0:5 if F is skewed
towards the lowest mean belief , and larger than 0:5 if F is skewed towards the
highest mean belief 1  . But when F is symmetrically distributed over [; 1  ], b
would be equal to 0:5, which is the following corollary.
Corollary 5 Under Assumption 1,
b = 0:5
if F is a symmetric distribution function over [; 1  ] (i.e., F (1  x) = 1   F (x)
for any x 2 [; 1  ]).
In practice, the empirical chart would precisely follow Figure 1 with the jump at 0:5
in the case of symmetry, but not if asymmetries were present. But even if one might
expect skewness to be present for some contracts but not others, the range for the
crossover point could be scattered about the neighborhood of 0:5. The aggregation
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of a large number of contracts, therefore, could push the average b to be in the
neighborhood of 0:5. Since each contract would exhibit a similar (if slightly shifted)
pattern, the overall pattern should loosely follow Figure 1 if Knightian uncertainty is
important in these markets, even though some reect symmetry whereas others do
not.
Accordingly, the theory suggests that the empirical relationship between P and 
would contain a testable structural break about the neighborhood of 0:5, where one
would expect to see observations scattered below the 45-degree line to the left of the
break-point, and above the 45-degree line to the right. The presence of a structural
break adjacent to 0:5, therefore, would be an indication that Knightian uncertainty
is a factor in the market, and would be consistent with the intuition provided in the
introduction.
4 Empirical Evidence
In this section, we provide some high-level evidence that is consistent with the theo-
retical predictions.5
We use the historical data from Intrade, a popular online prediction platform
which operated from 2003 to 2013. The platform hosted prediction contracts across
wide-ranging categories of events, such as business (e.g., whether the CEO of a certain
company would step down), current events (e.g., which city would host the Olympic),
entertainment (e.g., which movie would win the Academy Award for the Best Picture),
politics (e.g., which candidate would be elected the U.S. president), etc. We collect
all those contracts that are on binary events, regardless of their categories, and record
how each binary event had turned out.
The aim of the empirical analysis is to estimate the ex post sample proportion,
P , of event As occurrence as a function of the ex ante price, , of contract A. We
process the data in the following way. The observations are sorted by price and
evenly partitioned into a number of percentile bins. For each percentile bin, we
calculate the sample proportion of event As occurrences whose corresponding prices
fall into that bin. Finally, we plot the sample proportions against the mid-points of
the corresponding price bins.
5See Appendix B for the details of the empirics.
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If the theory developed in the previous section holds, the following is what one
would expect in the empirics. Recall that the value of b depends on the distribution
of mean beliefs among traders. Since each observation in the dataset is from a certain
market with a certain distribution of mean beliefs held by the participating traders,
we can interpret each observation as a single draw from the data-generating process
associated with a certain version of Figure 1. For a price bin closer to 0, therefore, it
is more likely that the observations contained in the bin have been drawn from the
left part of Figure 1, i.e., below the break-point. Similarly, for a price bin closer to
1, the observations are more likely to have been drawn from the right part of Figure
1, i.e., above the break-point. More important, when the price bin is near 0:5, the
observations are more likely to be from just around the jump, suggesting a structural
break.
We start with the empirical evidence from political events, one of the largest
categories in the Intrade dataset. These events, like Brexit and U.S. presidential
elections, often see a high volume of transactions between bettors. Figure 2, based on
a partition into 50 bins (i.e., 2% of observations per bin), plots the sample proportion
for all bins against the corresponding price. Since prices evolve over time in the
prediction markets until the random events are realized, the two panels of the gure
together capture the e¤ect of timing by showing the estimation for two di¤erent dates:
(a) the rst day market opens to bettors, and (b) the last trading day before the event
is realized, respectively.
For each panel, we conduct three analyses. First, a linear regression assuming no
structural breaks is shown as the dashed line in the diagram. Next, we run two types
of break-point tests an F test6 and a moving sum of residuals(MOSUM) test7
against the null hypothesis that there is no structural breaks for the entire sample.
Lastly, we re-run the linear regression by estimating the location of one break-point
(as suggested by our theory). The estimation returns (i) a linear segment on each side
of the estimated structural break, plotted as the solid lines in the diagram, as well
as (ii) the location of the structural break, identied by two red dots in the diagram
corresponding to, respectively, the last observation of the rst segment and the rst
6The F test is an extension of the Chow test(1960), against the alternative hypothesis of an
unknown break-point. See, e.g., Andrews (1993) and Andrews and Ploberger (1994) for details.
7The MOSUM test analyzes the moving sum of residuals and detects whether a strong shift of
the uctuation process exists. See, e.g., Chu, Hornik, and Kuan (1995a, b) for details.
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Figure 2: Prediction Market Data in the P - Diagram: Politics (50 bins).
(Note: The dashed lines are regression lines without breaks. The solid lines are regression
lines with one estimated break, with two red dots identifying the location of the break.)
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observation of the second segment. The details of the three analyses are shown in the
column 50 binsof Table 1.
A few remarks on the results follow. First, in both panels, the regression lines
without structural breaks fall very close to the 45-degree line, suggesting the overall
e¢ ciency of markets in pricing the probabilities of random events. The evidence of
market e¢ ciency on the rst trading day is remarkable because, for politics, a lot of
markets opened a long time sometimes years ahead of the resolution of the events.
Yet, as the regression table shows, the slopes are statistically signicant and very
close to 1.
Second, although panel (a) is relatively noisier, panel (b) shows a clear pattern
as predicted by our theory: The null hypothesis of no structural breaks is cleared
rejected by the tests, and the break-point estimation shows a signicant jump near
price level 0:5. The diagram, hence, resembles our prediction shown in Figure 1. For
observations in the intermediate price range, one might think that the price is close
to 0:5 because traders have solid information suggesting an even matchbetween
outcome A and Ac. It is also possible, however, that the market is shrouded in
ambiguity as some traders, albeit partially informed, are reluctant to trade. Just like
in the example of a Knightian urn, an intermediate price in this case could mean a
wide range of true probabilities. In panel (b), for a price in the break region between
0:57 and 0:69, the sample proportion could be as low as 33%, or as high as 83%.
In other words, the degree of ambiguity, , in this particular example is about 0:25
(i.e., half of 83%   33%). Such a magnitude is signicant not only statistically
as the rejection of null hypothesis no structural breaksimplies the rejection of 
equals to zero but also economically. According to the multiple-prior framework,
it would mean that a typical trader would consider all the probabilities within an
interval of length 0:5 equally admissible in governing the realization of the binary
event. A signicant jump near price level 0:5 like the one in panel (b), therefore, is an
indication of the presence of Knightian uncertainty. As the linear regression without
breaks shows, the specic pattern of observations also causes the regression line to
have a slope larger albeit only slightly than 1.
Another important di¤erence between the two panels is that, in panel (b), more
observations are clustered near price levels 0 and 1. This means, by the last day,
more traders hold (posterior) beliefs that some outcome either A or Ac is very
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Table 1: Estimation and Test of Structural Breaks: Politics
Dependent variable: ex post sample proportion
Independent variable: ex ante price
50 bins 30 bins
(a) rst trading day
slope (no breaks) 0.953 0.950
(22.7) (21.5)
tests of no breaks
F test not rejected not rejected
MOSUM test not rejected rejected
structural break estimation
slope (segment 1) 0.727 0.690
(5.75) (5.13)
break region [0.45, 0.47] [0.43, 0.47]
slope (segment 2) 0.863 0.867
(7.70) (7.56)
(b) last trading day
slope (no breaks) 1.03 1.04
(44.8) (44.8)
tests of no breaks
F test rejected rejected
MOSUM test rejected rejected
structural break estimation
slope (segment 1) 0.617 0.767
(15.6) (21.4)
break region [0.57, 0.69] [0.60, 0.75]
slope (segment 2) 0.464 0.229
(5.10) (2.13)
t statistics in parentheses
^ p < 0:1,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01,  p < 0:001
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likely to be realized, suggesting a decrease in risks over time. Such a decrease in
risks can be a result of information acquisition by the traders, who, until the random
events resolve, may have the incentives to learn about the events and update their
bets accordingly. Since risks have decreased while ambiguity remains, our empirical
evidence also suggests an observational distinction between the concepts of risk and
Knightian uncertainty.
Furthermore, the above empirical patterns are to some extent robust against the
choice of the number of bins. Figure 3 reproduces the diagram by partitioning the
data into 30 bins instead. The column 30 bins of Table 1 shows the details of
the regression and break-point analysis. Overall, the observations drawn earlier still
hold.8
The observation that ambiguity remains until the last trading day suggests, unlike
risks, Knightian uncertainty may be not learnablein practice to the traders. The
intuition can be illustrated using the Knightian urn where the composition of black
and red balls is unknown. Imagine two di¤erent scenarios. In the rst scenario, a
subject observed repeated draws from the same Knightian urn. In this case, the
sample proportion over time would reveal the true composition of the two colors
because, after all, the composition is xed over time. In the second scenario, there was
an experimenter who replaced the Knightian urn with a new one every time a ball was
drawn by the subject. In this case, the sample proportion may not inform the subject
of what to expect in the next Knightian urn, simply because the composition of black
and red balls in the new urn could be anything of the experimenters choosing. If the
underlying data-generating process that is, the way the experimenter changed every
other Knightian urn was not learnable to the subject, then the degree of ambiguity
would not decrease over time.9 One might think that, in politics, it is intuitively easy
for traders to acquire knowledge from polls, news reports, political analyses, etc.
Yet, our empirical evidence, which is based on a large number of prediction markets
about various political events, seems to t the second scenario, suggesting that the
Knightian uncertainty of politics may indeed be not learnablethrough information
acquisition.
8We have checked other variations between 30 and 50, which yield similar results (omitted to
limit space). Obviously, the number of bins should be neither too small (which would leave too few
points in the diagram), nor too large (which would leave too few observations per bin).
9See Epstein and Schneider (2007) for a theoretical treatment of learning under ambiguity.
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Figure 3: Prediction Market Data in the P - Diagram: Politics (30 bins).
(Note: The dashed lines are regression lines without breaks. The solid lines are regression
lines with one estimated break, with two red dots identifying the location of the break.)
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We now turn to another major category: entertainment events, such as the winners
of cinematic awards or the box o¢ ces of movies. Figures 4 and 5 reproduce the P -
diagram for 30 bins and 50 bins, respectively, and Table 2 reports the details of the
regressions and break-point tests. Although qualitatively similar, the patterns are less
pronounced compared to politics. The jump near 0:5 is less clear and, interestingly,
the clustering near 0 and 1 is less marked. This evidence suggests less learning in
entertainment than in politics, which is understandable since it is more di¢ cult for
bettors to acquire information about the general publics personal tastes of movies
and music.
Politics and entertainment together accounts for over 80% of the Intrade dataset.
However, for completeness, we reproduce the empirical evidence with the full sam-
ple, as shown in Figures 6 and 7, as well as Table 3. The patterns, essentially by
construction, are similar to what we establish above.
5 Concluding Remarks
Knightian uncertainty an important theoretical concept in the literature that is of-
ten used to explain observed phenomena has never been directly evidenced in an
empirical setting. In this paper, we have developed a model of a prediction market
with ambiguity, where traders have maxmin preferences. We have derived more di-
rect, observational implications of the presence of Knightian uncertainty. Using the
historical betting data from Intrade, we have further presented some high-level ev-
idence that is consistent with the prediction of our model. In particular, for price
levels close to 0:5, the market-implied, ex ante probability of a random event is not
indicative of the ex post sample proportion, suggesting the presence of Knightian
uncertainty.
Moreover, our empirical evidence has shown that, although traders seem to have
acquired information which leads to a decrease in risks, ambiguity remains until the
last trading day, suggesting that the Knightian uncertainty of the world may be not
learnableto traders. By comparing political events and entertainment events, we
have also shown that the empirical patterns we identied are more pronounced in
politics than in entertainment.
The evidence we have provided is only preliminary, since the empirics of this
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Figure 4: Prediction Market Data in the P - Diagram: Entertainment (50 bins).
(Note: The dashed lines are regression lines without breaks. The solid lines are regression
lines with one estimated break, with two red dots identifying the location of the break.)
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Figure 5: Prediction Market Data in the P - Diagram: Entertainment (30 bins).
(Note: The dashed lines are regression lines without breaks. The solid lines are regression
lines with one estimated break, with two red dots identifying the location of the break.)
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Table 2: Estimation and Test of Structural Breaks: Entertainment
Dependent variable: ex post sample proportion
Independent variable: ex ante price
50 bins 30 bins
(a) rst trading day
slope (no breaks) 0.933 0.936
(20.9) (23.3)
tests of no breaks
F test not rejected not rejected
MOSUM test not rejected not rejected
structural break estimation
slope (segment 1) 0.859 0.929
(8.66) (16.2)
break region [0.50, 0.50] [0.68, 0.73]
slope (segment 2) 0.881 1.49
(6.80) (4.89)
(b) last trading day
slope (no breaks) 1.04 1.04
(33.7) (37.8)
tests of no breaks
F test rejected rejected
MOSUM test rejected^ not rejected
structural break estimation
slope (segment 1) 0.744 0.697
(10.3) (10.3)
break region [0.50, 0.51] [0.44, 0.49]
slope (segment 2) 0.866 1.00
(9.02) (16.2)
t statistics in parentheses
^ p < 0:1,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01,  p < 0:001
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Figure 6: Prediction Market Data in the P - Diagram: Full Sample (50 bins).
(Note: The dashed lines are regression lines without breaks. The solid lines are regression
lines with one estimated break, with two red dots identifying the location of the break.)
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Figure 7: Prediction Market Data in the P - Diagram: Full Sample (30 bins).
(Note: The dashed lines are regression lines without breaks. The solid lines are regression
lines with one estimated break, with two red dots identifying the location of the break.)
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Table 3: Estimation and Test of Structural Breaks: Full Sample
Dependent variable: ex post sample proportion
Independent variable: ex ante price
50 bins 30 bins
(a) rst trading day
slope (no breaks) 0.917 0.929
(63.6) (27.7)
tests of no breaks
F test not rejected not rejected
MOSUM test not rejected not rejected
structural break estimation
slope (segment 1) 0.936 0.739
(18.0) (8.50)
break region [0.59, 0.61] [0.44, 0.48]
slope (segment 2) 1.26 0.876
(9.56) (10.5)
(b) last trading day
slope (no breaks) 1.03 1.03
(56.6) (46.5)
tests of no breaks
F test rejected rejected
MOSUM test rejected rejected^
structural break estimation
slope (segment 1) 0.853 0.812
(25.2) (20.9)
break region [0.62, 0.68] [0.55, 0.65]
slope (segment 2) 0.693 0.765
(7.84) (9.27)
t statistics in parentheses
^ p < 0:1,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01,  p < 0:001
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paper are based on a single prediction platform that is skewed towards political and
entertainment events. In a future, empirical study, we will collect more prediction-
market data across di¤erent platforms and di¤erent event types, and we will examine
more closely the relationship between the ex post sample proportion and the ex ante
price by taking into account the type of events, the time ahead of the resolution of
randomness, and other aspects of the betting markets.
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Appendix A Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. Note that any equilibrium price  has to satisfy (i)
 > 2 and (ii)  < 1 2. If (i) does not hold, then   qi+  for all i, which means
any trader will have either a long position or a zero position not an equilibrium.
Similarly, if (ii) does not hold, no trader will have a long position, which cannot be
an equilibrium either.
Substitute (2) into (3) and rewrite the aggregate demand as
XF () =
Z  

q +   
 (1  )wdF (q) +
Z 1 
+
q     
 (1  )wdF (q) :
Hence, XF () = 0 if and only ifZ  

(q +   ) dF (q) +
Z 1 
+
(q     ) dF (q) = 0
,
Z  

(q   ) dF (q) +
Z 1 
+
(q   ) dF (q) +
Z  

dF (q) 
Z 1 
+
dF (q) = 0
, EF (q)    
Z +
 
(q   ) dF (q) +  [F (   ) + F ( + )  1] = 0
, EF (q)   +
Z +
 
F (q) dq   [(q   )F (q)]+  +  [F (   ) + F ( + )  1] = 0;
where the last step follows from integration by parts. Simplifying and rearranging
terms yields the stated expression in the proposition.
Proof of Proposition 2. Let G be the space of distribution functions over [; 1  ],
endowed with the Lévy metric `, where
` (G1; G2)
 inf f" > 0 j G1 (q   ")  "  G2  G1 (q + ") + " for all q 2 [; 1  ]g
for anyG1; G2 2 G. Let F be the subset of G that satises F = EF (q) for any F 2 F .
Since the Lévy metric metrizes the weak topology,10 the proposition is equivalent to
the claim that F is nowhere dense in (G; `).
10See, e.g., Huber and Ronchetti (2009), p. 28.
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Note that F is closed. Since a set is nowhere dense if and only if the complement
of its closure is dense,11, it remains to be shown GnF is dense, that is, for any point in
G, there is a sequence from G nF converging to that point. It is thus enough to show,
for any F 2 F and any  > 0, there exists some G 2 G n F such that ` (F;G) < .
F is non-decreasing since it is a distribution function. It follows that
lim
q![EF (q)+] 
F (q)  F (EF (q)  ) :
We show prove the results by examining two cases.
Case 1: limq![EF (q)+]  F (q) > F (EF (q)  ).
Given  > 0, we construct a distribution function G from F as
G (q) 
8><>:
F (q) if q 2 [;EF (q)    1) ;
F (EF (q)  ) if q 2 [EF (q)    1;EF (q) + + 2) ;
F (q) if q 2 [EF (q) + + 2; 1  ] ;
where 1; 2 > 0 are such that function g  G  F satises conditionsZ EF (q)++2
EF (q)  1
g (q) dq = 0
and
max fg (EF (q)    1) ; g (EF (q) + + 2)g = 
2
:
It is easily veried that G is a mean-preserving spread of F , with two new atoms
created at points EF (q)      1 and EF (q) +  + 2. By construction, this implies
that Z EG(q)+
EG(q) 
G (q) dq =
Z EF (q)+
EF (q) 
G (q) dq
=
Z EF (q)+
EF (q) 
[F (q) + g (q)] dq
= +
Z EF (q)+
EF (q) 
g (q) dq < ;
11See, e.g., Sutherland (1975), p. 64.
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where the last equality holds because F 2 F , and the inequality is due to g (EF (q) + ) <
0 which implies
R EF (q)+
EF (q)  g (q) dq < 0. Since
R EG(q)+
EG(q)  G (q) dq < , G 2 G n F . Finally,
let  be the uniform metric, that is,
 (G1; G2)  sup fjG1 (q) G2 (q)j j q 2 [; 1  ]g
for any G1; G2 2 G. By construction,  (F;G) = 2 . Since the Lévy metric is bounded
by the uniform metric from above, that is, ` (G1; G2)   (G1; G2) for any G1; G2 2 G,
we have ` (F;G)  
2
< .
Case 2: limq![EF (q)+]  F (q) = F (EF (q)  ).
Given  > 0, we construct a distribution function H from F as
H (q) 
8><>:
F (q) if q 2 [;EF (q)  ) ;
F (EF (q)  ) + 3 if q 2 [EF (q)  ;EF (q) + + 4) ;
F (q) if q 2 [EF (q) + + 4; 1  ] ;
where 3; 4 > 0 are such that function h  H   F satises conditionsZ EF (q)++4
EF (q) 
h (q) dq = 0
and
max f3; h (EF (q) + + 4)g = 
2
:
It is easily veried that H is a mean-preserving spread of F , with two new atoms
created at points EF (q)   and EF (q) + + 4. By construction, this implies thatZ EG(q)+
EG(q) 
H (q) dq =
Z EF (q)+
EF (q) 
H (q) dq
=
Z EF (q)+
EF (q) 
[F (q) + h (q)] dq
= +
Z EF (q)+
EF (q) 
h (q) dq
= + 23 > ;
where the last but second equality holds because F 2 F , and the last equality follows
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from the construction of H. Since
R EG(q)+
EG(q)  H (q) dq > , H 2 G n F . Finally, similar
to Case 1, we have  (F;H) = 
2
and, hence, ` (F;H) < .
Proof of Proposition 3. Decompose XF () into the aggregate supply (shorts)
SF () and the aggregate demand (longs) DF (), where
SF () =
Z  

 q +   
 (1  )wdF (q) ; DF () =
Z 1 
+
q     
 (1  )wdF (q) ;
and SF (F ) = DF (

F ) in equilibrium. We show that an increase in  shifts the
supply curve inwards. That is,
dSF ()
d
= 0 +
+   
 (1  )wdF () 
Z  

@
@
q +   
 (1  )wdF (q) < 0:
Similarly, an increase in  shifts the demand curve inwards (i.e., dDF ()
d
< 0). It follows
that the equilibrium quantity of trade SF (F ), or DF (

F ) has to be smaller as
the degree of ambiguity increases.
Proof of Proposition 4. Let  denote the integral of F , i.e.,  (q)  R q

F (q0) dq0.
It follows from the denition of F that
 (q) =
Z q

F (q0) dq0 =
(
(1 m)  (q) if q 2 [; p) ;
(1 m)  (q) +m (q   p) if q 2 [p; 1  ] ;
where  is the integral of F . The equilibrium condition becomes
 = EF (q) +  ( + )   (   )  
= 1  2   (1  ) +  ( + )   (   ) ;
where the second equality follows from integration by parts. Since  (q) has a kink
at point p, the equilibrium price depends on the position of p relative to  +  and
   .
Case 1:      p   + .
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The equilibrium condition is rewritten as
 = 1  2  (1 m)  (1  ) m (1    p)
+ (1 m)  ( + ) +m ( +   p)  (1 m)  (   ) :
Rearranging terms and dividing both sides by 1 m yields
    ( + ) +  (   ) = 1  2   (1  ) :
Case 2: p >  + .
The equilibrium condition is rewritten as
 = 1  2  (1 m)  (1  ) m (1    p)
+ (1 m)  ( + )  (1 m)  (   ) :
Rearranging terms yields

1 m    ( + ) +  (   ) = 1  2   (1  ) +
(p  )m
1 m : (4)
Note that the left-hand side of equation (4) is strictly increasing in . Thus, the
solution  to the equation is a continuous and strictly increasing function of p.
Furthermore, as p! b+ , where b is the equilibrium price in Case 1, the right-hand
side of equation (4) converges to 1   2    (1  ) + bm
1 m , and the solution to the
equation converges to b. In other words, the equilibrium price is continuous at point
p = b + .
Next, we show  (1  ) < 1   2, which implies  (1  ) < 1    in part 1 of
the proposition. Let LHS () and RHS (p) denote the left- and right-hand sides of
equation (4), as functions of  and p, respectively. Note that
LHS (1  2) RHS (1  ) =

1  2
1 m    (1  ) +  (1  3)

 

1  2   (1  ) + (1  2)m
1 m

= (1  3) > 0:
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Since LHS is strictly increasing in , the solution to the equation when p = 1   
must be smaller than 1  2.
Case 3: p <    .
The equilibrium condition is rewritten as
 = 1  2  (1 m)  (1  ) m (1    p)
+ (1 m)  ( + ) +m ( +   p)
  (1 m)  (   ) m (     p) :
Rearranging terms yields

1 m    ( + ) +  (   ) = 1  2   (1  ) +
(p+ )m
1 m : (5)
Similar to Case 2, the solution  to equation (5) is continuous and strictly increasing
in p, and it converges to b as p ! b   . Hence, the equilibrium price is continuous
at point p = b    as well.
Next, we show  () > 2, which implies  () >  in part 1 of the proposition.
Again, let LHS () and RHS (p) denote the left- and right-hand sides of equation
(5). Note that
LHS (2) RHS () =

2
1 m    (3) +  ()

 

1  2   (1  ) + 2m
1 m

=

 (1  )   (3)  [(1  )  3] < 0;
where the last inequality holds because  is the integral of distribution function F
over [; 1  ]. Since LHS is strictly increasing in , the solution to the equation
when p =  must be larger than 2.
Proof of Corollary 5. Recall that b is identied by equation
b    (b + ) +  (b   ) = 1  2   (1  ) :
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The symmetry of F implies   (1  x) = (x  )  (x) for any x 2 [; 1  ]. Thus,
the equilibrium condition becomes
b   b + (1  b   )+ (b   ) = 1  2  1  2+ ()
,  (1  b   )   (b   ) =  () = 0;
to which b = 0:5 is the only solution.
37
Appendix B Empirics
The historical data of Intrade was archived by Ipeirotis (2013) and is available on
GitHub. Table 4 lists all the categories of events and the number of markets within
each category. We complete the dataset by creating an outcome variable and recording
how each random event had turned out. The outcome equals 1 if an event occurs,
and it equals 0 if its complement event occurs.
Some markets have correlated outcomes, because they are about the same, uncer-
tain circumstances. For example, concerning the 2012 U.S. Republican Party presi-
dential nominee, there are 53 separate markets corresponding to 53 possible winners,
including Mitt Romney, Rick Santorum, Ron Paul, Newt Gingrich, and any other
individual not specied by the prediction platform. To avoid such correlation in
the observations, for each group of these correlated markets, we randomly select one
market into the aggregate sample and disregard the rest.
The total number of selected markets included in the nal analysis also shown in
Table 5. The table lists the number of observations the total as well as the number
of observations per percentile bin for political events, entertainment events, and the
full sample. The dataset is skewed towards political and entertainment events, as the
two categories together accounts for 82% of the full sample.
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Table 4: Intrade Data: Event Categories and Number of Markets.
Event category Number of markets
Art 60
Business 43
Chess 52
Climate & Weather 861
Construction & Engineering 9
Current Events 1540
Education 1
Entertainment 8715
Fine Wine 5
Foreign A¤airs 87
Legal 310
Media 10
Politics 5460
Real Estate 2
Science 20
Social & Civil 30
Technologies 65
Transportation 11
Table 5: Intrade Data: Number of Observations in Final Analysis.
Event category Total observations Observations per bin
(50 bins) (30 bins)
Politics 897 18 30
Entertainment 1157 23 39
Full sample 2509 50 84
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